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THE MESS AT MORGAN: RISK, INCENTIVES AND
SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT
Jill E. Fisch *

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate
America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial
institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the
corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement
actions.
In addition, demands for greater accountability led
policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decisionmaking structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to
further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s
advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.
This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of
public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate decisions with an
increased public responsibility is misguided. The incorporation of
publicness into corporate governance mistakenly assumes that
shareholders’ interests are aligned with those of non-shareholder
stakeholders.
Because this alignment is imperfect, corporate
governance is a poor tool for addressing the role of the corporation as a
public actor.
The case of JP Morgan and the London whale offers an example.
Although JP Morgan suffered a massive loss due to the whale’s risky
trading decisions, JP Morgan shareholders benefited from this risktaking. Accordingly, shareholders were poorly positioned to address the
incentives that drove risky operational decisions. So-called “improved
corporate governance” in the form of shareholder empowerment, rather
than functioning as a solution, may have exacerbated the problem. In
the end, the mess at Morgan demonstrates limitations on the value of
shareholder empowerment in addressing the public impact of the
corporation and suggests that, at least in some cases, regulatory
approaches such as the Volcker rule may be warranted.
I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2012, the financial media reported large derivatives trading
by a JP Morgan Chase & Co. (JP Morgan) trader known as the London
* Perry Golkin Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful for
the many helpful comments provided by participants at the University of Pennsylvania’s Ad Hoc
Faculty Seminar.
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whale. 1 JP Morgan eventually reported a $6.2 billion loss stemming
from the whale’s proprietary trading in derivatives. Over the course of
the next several months, JP Morgan’s troubles multiplied such that the
original whale began to seem more like a minnow. News reports
revealed JP Morgan’s involvement in wide-ranging misconduct—from
unfair credit card billing practices to misrepresentations in the sale of
mortgage-related products to investors. 2 Overall, in a two and a half
year period from June of 2011 to January of 2014, JP Morgan paid
almost $34 billion in fines and penalties. 3
The revelations were particularly notable in that, until early 2012, JP
Morgan appeared to have escaped the widespread misfortunes
associated with the financial crisis. Policymakers argued that the
financial crisis was caused, in part, by excessive risk taking by Wall
Street financial institutions. 4 This risk-taking led to the collapse of
many large banks including Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and
Wachovia, and required an unprecedented government bailout.
President Obama criticized the “fat cat bankers” for continuing to take
large bonuses while the country and their stockholders suffered. 5
Yet, at the same time, commentators praised JP Morgan for adhering
to a conservative investment strategy that enabled it to weather the
storm. 6 JP Morgan was the only large financial institution to post a
profit during the financial crisis. JP Morgan was also the first bank to
repay the funds it received from the government through the Troubled
Asset Relief Program. 7
The reputational hit experienced by JP Morgan following the whale
1. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, 'London Whale' Rattles Debt Market, Wall St.
J.
(Apr.
6,
2012,
1:19
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577326031119412436.
2. To be fair, a substantial percentage of this wrongdoing was by Bear Stearns and Washington
Mutual, two firms that JP Morgan purchased in 2008. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Everything You Need to
Know About JPMorgan’s $13 Billion Settlement, WASH. POST. WONKBLOG (Nov. 19, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/21/everything-you-need-to-know-aboutjpmorgans-13-billion-settlement/ (although JP Morgan agreed to assume the liabilities incurred by those
firms, it did not directly engage in the most of the misconduct).; see also id. (stating that 70-80% of the
activity leading to JP Morgan’s $13 billion settlement with the Justice Department regarding its
mortgage-backed securities activities was by the acquired companies rather than JP Morgan itself – the
Whale, in contrast, was all JP Morgan).
3. See Jared Cummans, A Brief History of JP Morgan’s Massive Fines,
DIVIDEND.COM (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.dividend.com/dividend-education/a-brief-history-of-jpmorgans-massive-fines-jpm/ (reporting fines paid by JP Morgan from June 2011 through January 2014).
4. See Elizabeth Williamson, Obama Slams 'Fat Cat' Bankers, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2009,
11:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB126073152465089651 (quoting then White House
economic advisor Larry Summers).
5. Id.
6. Pallavi Gogoi, CEO Jamie Dimon Steers JPMorgan Chase Through Crisis, USA TODAY
(Jul. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=8179742&page=1&singlePage=true.
7. Id.
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and the subsequent revelations 8 solidified the demand—sparked by the
financial crisis—for the increased accountability of corporate managers.
This demand led to demands for increased shareholder empowerment
premised on the view that the failures at the large banks were, at least in
part, governance failures. 9 Shareholder empowerment was a substantial
component of the regulatory strategy of the Dodd Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank). 10 One component
of Dodd-Frank’s shareholder empowerment approach is its mandate that
publicly-traded corporations provide shareholders with an advisory vote
on executive compensation—Say on Pay. 11
The substantial impact that large public corporations have on a broad
range of constituencies has long been recognized. 12
Recent
commentators13 have termed this phenomenon “publicness,” by which
they mean the actions of the corporation that affect the economy and
society generally rather than just shareholder interests. 14
One regulatory response to publicness is increased shareholder
8. See Hillary Sale, J.P. Morgan: An Anatomy of Corporate Publicness, 79 BROOK. L. REV.
1630 (2014) (stating that, “[i]ndeed, in the wake of the Whale, J.P. Morgan and its Chief Executive
Officer, Jamie Dimon, went from being a post-financial crisis “poster child” and media darlings, to
punching bags.”). See also Harry Bradford, JPMorgan Chase's Reputation Falls To Lowest Level On
POST
(May
23,
2012),
Record
In
Wake
Of
$2B
Loss,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/23/jpmorgan-chases-consumer-reputationyougov_n_1540582.html (reporting that Morgan’s reputation fell after the Whale to its lowest point on
record). See also Steve Denning, JPMorgan And The Death Of Corporate Reputation, FORBES (May 3,
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/05/03/jpmorgan-and-the-death-of-corporatereputation/ (questioning extent to which reputation still matters).
9. See Hamid Mehran, et al., Corporate Governance and Banks: What Have We Learned from
the Financial Crisis, Fed. Res. Bank Staff Report No. 502 June 2011 (surveying literature).
10. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, and 31 U.S.C). See Usha
Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1822, 1838–39 (2011) (describing Dodd-Frank’s regulatory strategy of shareholder
empowerment).
11. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1.
12. The actions of corporations have, of course, always affected the public interest, which is
what justifies their regulation under a wide range of laws from environmental to antitrust. See Part III,
infra.
13. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary
Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEORGETOWN L.J. 337 (2013); see also Donald C.
Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial
Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573, 1628 (2013); See, e.g., Joan Heminway, Securities
Regulation at the Public/Private Divide (If There Still is a Divide . . .), BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Aug. 11,
2014),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/08/securities-regulation-at-thepublicprivate-divide-if-there-still-is-a-divide-.html; Jonathan Glater, Private Offerings and Public Ends:
Reconsidering the Regime for Classification of Investors under the Securities Act of 1933 (working
paper 2015).
14. Hillary Sale, Public Governance, 81 WASH U. L. REV. 1012, 1013 (2013) [hereinafter Sale,
Public Governance] (describing publicness as the actions of corporate actors that affect the economy
and society generally, rather than just the shareholders).

654

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

empowerment. Claiming that the widespread misconduct of the
financial crisis reflected a failure of corporate governance, policymakers
have begun to seek to harness the corporation’s internal decisionmaking structure to further the public interest.
This essay argues that such an approach is misguided in its efforts to
employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate
corporate decisions with an increased public responsibility through
improved corporate governance. The incorporation of publicness into
corporate governance mistakenly assumes that shareholders’ interests
are aligned with those of non-shareholder stakeholders such as
customers, creditors and employees as well as society more generally.
Because this alignment is imperfect, corporate governance is a poor tool
for addressing the role of the corporation as a public actor.
The limitations of shareholder empowerment should not be
surprising. The financial crisis followed a period in which large
institutional shareholders had become increasingly active in monitoring
management decisions and demanding greater accountability for those
decisions. Despite this activism, large scandals appear to be more
frequent than ever. The financial crisis itself offers reasons to question
to the efficacy of shareholder empowerment.
This essay examines the effectiveness of shareholder empowerment
by way of an example—the case of JP Morgan and the London whale.
The whale illustrates the potential public consequences of excessive
corporate risk-taking. That the whale was a public problem is
demonstrated by the fact that its revelation spurred two congressional
hearings, generated a 300-page Senate report and resulted in JP Morgan
paying more than $1 billion in fines to US and UK regulators. At the
same time, the whale demonstrates why shareholders are poorly
positioned to curb managerial risk-taking. Executives at JP Morgan
were compensated in a manner that created powerful incentives for them
to take substantial risks and, despite the potential problems that these
incentives created from a public perspective, they were approved by JP
Morgan shareholders.
Indeed, shareholder empowerment, rather than functioning as a
solution to excessive risk-taking may be part of the problem. Because
risk-taking is beneficial to shareholders, empowered shareholders may
encourage corporate managers to make overly risky operational
decisions. The problem is exacerbated by executive compensation
reforms that place growing emphasis on the relationship between
executive compensation and shareholder returns and that subject the
resulting pay structures to increased shareholder oversight. 15

15. Ira T. Kay, The Unintended Consequences of Say on Pay Votes, HARV. L. SCHOOL FORUM
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Ultimately, increased accountability to address the potential for
corporations to cause public harm may have to come from outside
corporate law. The Volcker rule, 16 which both limits bank participation
in risky trading activities and which restructures the incentive structure
of bank compensation programs, is an example of this approach.
Although a detailed analysis of the Volcker rule is beyond the scope of
this essay, the rule suggests that regulatory alternatives may be
warranted to the extent that shareholder interests imperfectly reflect
those of the general public. Toward that end, policymakers may have
been justified in using the Volcker rule to address the problems reflected
by the whale.
II. THE MESS AT MORGAN
A. The Whale
The trouble at JP Morgan started with media reports about the
London whale. 17 In April 2012, Bloomberg News reported that a JP
Morgan trader was making large enough trades to move prices in the
$10 trillion bond market. 18 The trader, deemed the “London Whale,”
was Bruno Iksil, an employee in JP Morgan’s London Chief Investment
Office (CIO). 19 JP Morgan had spun off the CIO as a separate unit of
the bank in 2005 to invest the bank’s excess deposits. 20 The CIO began
trading synthetic credit derivatives in 2006. 21 Employees in the CIO

ON
CORP.
GOV.
&
FIN.
REG.
(July
8,
2013
9:35
AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/07/08/the-unintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes/
(“TSR is often replacing a broad portfolio of metrics including profitability, cash flow and capital
returns, which are key metrics in the business strategy. This change may have negative consequences on
executive motivation and possibly encourage excessive risk taking.”).
16. The Volcker Rule is section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1851. The rules implementing section 619 are Prohibitions and
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests In, and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and
Private Equity Funds, 17 CFR Part 255, Dec. 10, 2013, (Volcker Rule Adopting Release), available at
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/bhca-1.pdf.
17. JP Morgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses, Staff
Report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, U.S. SENATE, Apr. 11, 2013, at 10, available at
http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/report-jpmorgan-chase-whale-trades-a-case-history-ofderivatives-risks-and-abuses-march-15-2013 [hereinafter Senate Report] (observing that the public first
learned about the whale trades on April 6, 2012).
18. Stephanie Ruhle, Bradley Keoun, & Mary Childs, JPMorgan Trader’s Positions Said to
Distort Credit Indexes, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-0405/jpmorgan-trader-iksil-s-heft-is-said-to-distort-credit-indexes.html.
19. Gregory Zuckerman & Katy Burne, London Whale Rattles Debt Market, WALL ST. J., April
6, 2012, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577326031119412436
20. Senate Report, supra note 17 at 35.
21. Id. at 3.
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termed this trading activity the Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) in
2008. 22 During the 2008 financial crisis, the bank received $100 billion
in new deposits from investors seeking safety. 23 These deposits had the
effect of doubling the portfolio that the CIO was responsible for
investing. By 2012, the CIO’s portfolio amounted to $350 billion. 24
Although JP Morgan described the CIO’s objectives as risk
management and hedging, 25 the SCP increased in both size and riskiness
during 2011 and early 2012. The notional amount of the portfolio
increased from $4 billion to $157 billion and more importantly, the
portfolio increased in risk as the CIO took the portfolio into a net long
position and ceased to engage in hedging trades. 26 Traders described the
portfolio as “huge” and of a “perilous size” by the end of March 2012. 27
Initially the SCP was a source of substantial revenue for JP Morgan,
generating $1.8 billion in revenues from 2008 to 2011. 28 By early 2012,
however, the market had turned against the CIO, and the SCP was losing
money. 29 Rather than reducing the trading activity, the CIO increased
the size of its trades in an effort to recover on its losing positions. 30
Even when the Whale’s trading losses came to light, JP Morgan
employees failed to acknowledge and address the problem. 31 In an
effort to hide the growing size of its losses, the CIO began to manipulate
its method of valuing the credit derivatives in its portfolio. 32 The fake
valuations, hiding billions of dollars in losses, were so substantial that
Bruno Iksil described them as “idiotic.” 33 Additionally, JP Morgan used
the artificial numbers in its regulatory filings, misstating the company’s
financial position to regulators and investors and hiding losses totaling
hundreds of millions. 34
In April 2013, JP Morgan booked a $718 million loss, but it did not
disclose the amount of that loss publicly. 35 Instead, following the media
22. Id. at 35.
23. Id. at 21.
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id. at 22, 42–43.
26. Id. at 35. It appears that the SCP’s shift in trading strategy was intended, at least initially to
reduce the level of the CIO’s risk weighted assets. See id. at 52.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 56.
29. See id. at 35 (describing the SCP’s losses during early 2012).
30. Id. at 73–76.
31. Id. at 96.
32. Id. at 5, 96.
33. Id. at 96.
34. Id. at 6.
35. Michael J. Moore & Dawn Kopecki, Dimon Saw $1 Billion Potential Loss When He Made
‘Teapot’ Remark, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-13/dimonsaw-1-billion-potential-loss-when-he-made-teapot-remark.html.
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reports in April, CEO Jamie Dimon told analysts that the Whale was “a
complete tempest in a teapot.” 36 On May 10, 2012, JP Morgan publicly
announced a loss of $2 billion resulting from derivatives trading by the
CIO. 37 By the end of the year, the bank reported cumulative losses of
$6.2 billion. 38
The Whale generated tremendous publicity. At two separate
congressional hearings in June 2013, members of Congress reprimanded
JP Morgan executives, including CEO Jamie Dimon about the loss and
the bank’s response. 39 Dimon eventually conceded that he was “dead
wrong” in initially characterizing the matter as “a complete tempest in a
teapot.” 40 Dimon also acknowledged to Congress that the bank showed
“bad judgment,” was “stupid” and “took far too much risk.” 41 In March
2013, the Senate released a 300-page report of the findings by the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations that the bank had
misled investors and regulators. 42 In conjunction with the report, the
Subcommittee held an additional hearing on March 15, 2013, at which
five JP Morgan employees (but not Dimon) testified. 43
Following investigations by multiple regulators on two continents, JP
Morgan eventually agreed to pay over a billion dollars to settle charges
that it violated banking and securities laws and manipulated the
markets. 44 Bruno Iksil, who both personally executed the majority of
36. Polya Lesova, Dimon: London Whale Issues "Tempest in a Teapot", MARKETWATCH (Apr.
13, 2012), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dimon-london-whale-issues-tempest-in-a-teapot-201204-13-937450.
37. Dan Fitzpatrick, Gregory Zuckerman & Liz Rappaport, J.P. Morgan's $2 Billion Blunder,
ST.
J.,
(May
11,
2012),
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304070304577396511420792008.
38. Patricia Hurtado, The London Whale, BLOOMBERG QUICKTAKE (Sept. 12, 2014),
http://www.bloombergview.com/quicktake/the-london-whale.
39. See A Breakdown in Risk Management: What Went Wrong at JPMorgan Chase?: Hearing
Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. (2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg78850/pdf/CHRG-112shrg78850.pdf;
see
also
Examining Bank Supervision and Risk Management in Light of JPMorgan Chase’s Trading Loss:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Financial Services, 112th Cong. (2012), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/112-136.pdf.
40. Lesova, supra note 36.
41. Senate Report Blames JPMorgan Senior Managers For Bad Bets That Led To 'Whale' Loss,
HUFF. POST (Mar. 14, 2013 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/14/senate-reportjpmorgan-london-whale_n_2878702.html.
42. Senate Report, supra note 17.
43. See JPMorgan Chase Whale Trades: A Case History of Derivatives Risks and Abuses:
Hearing Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t
Affairs,
113th
Cong.
(2013),
available
at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG113shrg80222/pdf/CHRG-113shrg80222.pdf
&
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG113shrg85162/pdf/CHRG-113shrg85162.pdf (two volumes).
44. Silla Brush, JPMorgan to Pay $100 Million Fine on CFTC London Whale Claim,
BLOOMBERGBUSINESS (Oct. 16, 2013 5:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-1016/jpmorgan-to-pay-100-million-to-settle-cftc-claims-chilton-says.html.
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the CIO trades and assisted in covering them up, was not charged
criminally. 45 Nor were Ina Drew, who managed the CIO and Jamie
Dimon. 46 Two “mid-level” JP Morgan employees were indicted—
Javier Martin-Artajo, Iksil’s boss and Julien Grout, another CIO
trader. 47 As of last year, Martin-Artajo and Grout were in Europe
resisting extradition to the United States for trial. 48
One of the issues about the whale that drew substantial congressional
concern was the fact that, although JP Morgan claimed that the purpose
of the CIO was to engage in hedging, both the investment strategy of the
office and compensation structure of the CIO employees were
inconsistent with this claim. For example as the Senate Report
observed, JP Morgan’s public statements repeatedly characterized the
SCP as “hedging risk.” 49 In fact, at the same time that the bank was
making the statements, the SCP’s investments amplified the bank’s level
of risk. 50 Notably, the SCP’s trading activities were inconsistent with
hedging even before the events of 2012, but in earlier years, the SCP’s
risks resulted in profits rather than losses. 51
JP Morgan’s management and board ignored the risks associated with
the CIO’s derivatives trading. Although JP Morgan was touted for its
“best-in-class risk management,” 52 “from January 1 through April 30,
2012, CIO risk limits and advisories were breached more than 330
times.” 53 These breaches were not concealed by a single rogue trader,
but were repeatedly reported to Morgan management. 54 Nonetheless,
they were routinely ignored. 55 The congressional investigation revealed
“a bank culture in which risk limit breaches were routinely disregarded,
risk metrics were frequently criticized or downplayed, and risk
45. Iksil agreed to cooperate with prosecutors in their case against his former boss Martin-Artago
and fellow trader Julien Grout. See 'London Whale' Bruno Iksil to avoid charges over JPMorgan $6.2bn
loss, RT (Aug. 14, 2013 1:59 PM), http://rt.com/business/jpmorgan-london-whale-iksil-432/.
46. Agostino Fontevecchia, London Whale And Ina Drew Off The Hook As Two Ex-JPMorgan
(Aug.
14,
2013
1:07
PM),
Traders
Face
Criminal
Charges,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2013/08/14/london-whale-and-ina-drew-off-the-hook-astwo-ex-jpmorgan-traders-face-criminal-charges/.
47. Id.
48. Christina Rexrode, Two charged in London Whale losses still in Europe, MARKETWATCH
(Jan. 29, 2014 1:12 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/two-charged-in-london-whale-losses-stillin-europe-2014-01-29.
49. See, e.g. Senate Report, supra note 17 at 12–13 (quoting earnings call statements by CFO
Douglas Braunstein).
50. See id. at 12 (explaining that “as then configured, the SCP would have amplified rather than
reduced the bank’s losses in the event of a credit crisis”).
51. See id. at 55 (“JPMorgan Chase has been unable to explain how the 2011 trading strategy
that produced the $400 million gain functioned as a hedge or credit loss protection for the bank.”).
52. Id. at 153.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 25.
55. Id.
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evaluation models were targeted by bank personnel seeking to produce
artificially lower capital requirements.” 56
B. Beyond the Whale
In the months that followed the discovery of the whale, JP Morgan’s
legal troubles continued. In July 2013, the bank agreed to pay $410
million to settle charges that it manipulated electricity prices in
California and the Midwest over a two-year period. 57 Regulators
claimed that JP Morgan traders “gamed a complex web of rules that help
set the cost of electricity.” 58
The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission determined that JP Morgan traders had designed twelve
separate bidding strategies with the intent to receive above-market
payments, which JP Morgan did, in fact receive. 59
In September 2013, JP Morgan announced a settlement with the
office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in which it agreed to pay an
$80 million fine and to refund an additional $309 million to consumers
in connection with charges that JP Morgan engaged in unfair credit card
billing practices and improper debt collection litigation. 60 Although JP
Morgan did not admit to wrongdoing, according to the OCC, Morgan
violated sold consumers products that they did not want and engaged in
a variety of improper litigation practices that included filing inaccurate
sworn documents in court. 61
In October, JP Morgan agreed to pay $5.1 billion to settle claims by
the Federal Housing Financing Agency that it had misled Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac about the quality of nearly 129 mortgage-backed

56. Id.
57. Ryan Tracy & Dan Fitzpatrick, J.P. Morgan Settles Electricity-Market Case, WALL ST. J.
(July
30,
2013
5:45
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324170004578637662037547582.
58. Id.; see also Jessica Silver Greenberg & Ben Protess, JPMorgan Caught in Swirl of
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(May
2,
2013
10:00
PM),
Regulatory
Woes,
N.Y.
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/02/jpmorgan-caught-in-swirl-of-regulatorywoes/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (quoting a confidential government document stating that JP
Morgan devised “manipulative schemes” to transform “money-losing power plants into powerful profit
centers.”).
59. In re Make-Whole Payments & Related Bidding Strategies, 144 FERC ¶ 61068 (July 30,
2013), available at http://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20130730080931-IN11-8-000.pdf.
60. See Alan Zibel & Andrew R. Johnson, J.P. Morgan Settles Consumer Cases, WALL ST. J.
(Sept.
19,
2013
7:20
PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323308504579085020022276480.
61. In the Matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, et. al, Consent Order No. 2013-138 (Sep. 18, 2013),
available at http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-138.pdf; In the Matter of JP Morgan
Chase Bank, et. al, Consent Order No. 2013-139 (Sep. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.occ.gov/static/enforcement-actions/ea2013-139.pdf.
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securities for which they paid approximately $33 billion. 62
On November 15, 2013, Morgan agreed to pay a group of
institutional investors $4.5 billion to settle investor litigation over its
sale of mortgage-backed securities. 63 The following Monday, it
finalized a record-setting $13 billion settlement with the Justice
Department over the same activities. 64 As part of the settlement,
Morgan admitted to making "serious misrepresentations" to investors. 65
In January 2015, JP Morgan agreed to pay approximately $500 million
to settle a class action lawsuit arising out of the sales. 66
In December 2013 JP Morgan agreed to pay $108 million to settle
charges that it allegedly colluded with other big banks to manipulate
European and Japanese interest rates. 67 The settlement covers only the
Japanese benchmark; JP Morgan and several other banks continue to
maintain their innocence regarding the Euribor rate. 68 In March 2014,
the FDIC filed suit against JP Morgan along with 15 other banks in
connection with the rate-rigging scandal. 69
Additionally, in January 2014, JP Morgan agreed to pay a fine of $2
billion to resolve investigations that it failed to warn the government
about Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme. 70 Documents filed by the
government indicated that JP Morgan employees suspected that Madoff
was involved in a Ponzi scheme as early as 2007, if not much earlier. In
June 2007, for example, JP Morgan chief risk officer John Hogan 71
62. Devlin Barrett, et al., J.P. Morgan Settles with FHFA, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2013 8:04 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303615304579157931846055864
(the
settlement included claims made against JP Morgan as well as claims based on the activities of
Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns).
63. Dan Fitzpatrick & Julie Steinberg, J. P. Morgan Reaches $4.5 Billion Settlement with
ST.
J.
(Nov.
15,
2013
6:26
PM),
Investors,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303289904579200283310122754
64. James O'Toole and Evan Perez, JPMorgan Agrees to $13 Billion Mortgage Settlement, CNN
MONEY (Nov. 29, 2013 7:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/11/19/investing/jpmorgan-mortgagesettlement/.
65. Id.
66. See Julie Steinberg, J.P. Morgan to Pay $500 Million to Settle Lawsuit, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 9,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-to-pay-500-million-to-settle-lawsuit-1420836735.
67. Danielle Douglas, JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup first U.S. banks to be fined in rate-rigging
scandal, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/eu-fines-firstus-banks-in-rate-rigging-scandal/2013/12/04/828468da-5cf6-11e3-95c2-13623eb2b0e1_story.html.
68. Id.
69. Trefis Team, FDIC Sues 16 Global Banks For Roles In Manipulating LIBOR, FORBES (Mar.
18, 2014 1:50 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2014/03/18/fdic-sues-16-globalbanks-for-roles-in-manipulating-libor/.
70. See Mark Hamblett, Bharara Says JPMorgan Deal Sends Message on Compliance, N.Y.L.J.
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202636806032 (the $2 billion consisted of a
$1.7 billion forfeiture for two counts of violating the Bank Secrecy Act and an additional $350 civil fine
to the Comptroller of the Currency).
71. Notably, John Hogan returned to Morgan in June 2013 after a brief leave of absence as
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wrote an email in which he described Madoff’s returns as “speculated to
be part of a Ponzi scheme.” 72 The recitation of facts in the deferred
prosecution agreement also referenced an Oct. 16, 2008 internal Morgan
memo in which a trader “described JPMC's inability to validate
Madoff's trading activity or even custody of assets; questioned Madoff’s
‘odd choice’ of a small, unknown accounting firm; and reported that
JPMC ‘seem[ed] to be relying on Madoff's integrity’ with little to verify
that such reliance was well-placed.” 73 Between the date of the memo
and Madoff’s December 2008 arrest, JP Morgan redeemed $275 million
of its own money from Madoff. 74 JP Morgan also reportedly earned
$435 million in profits on the investor funds that Madoff deposited in
the bank between 1993 and 2008. 75
The resolution of the Madoff case required JP Morgan to
acknowledge wrongdoing and included a deferred prosecution
agreement that gives the Justice Department the right to pursue criminal
charges against JP Morgan if the bank fails to live up to the settlement
terms. 76 The deferred charges are a willful failure to establish an antimoney laundering program, and failing to file a suspicious activity
report. 77
The litigation issues continue. The SEC is also investigating
allegations that Morgan violated anti-bribery laws by hiring the children
of well-connected politicians in China in exchange for receiving
business. 78 Documents reviewed by the New York Times reveal that
Dimon met at least one of the applicants that JP Morgan subsequently
hired, although he is not personally accused of any wrongdoing. 79 As
Chairman of Risk. See Matthias Rieker & Dan Fitzpatrick, John Hogan Returns to J.P. Morgan as
Chairman of Risk, WALL ST. J. MONEYBEAT (June 13, 2013, 11:38 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2013/06/13/john-hogan-returns-to-j-p-morgan-as-chairman-of-risk/.
72. Danielle Douglas, Government extracts $2 Billion in fines from JPMorgan in Madoff case,
WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/jpmorgan-to-paygovernment-17-billion-to-settle-madoff-allegations/2014/01/07/9f62839a-77a6-11e3-b1c5739e63e9c9a7_story.html.
73. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK N.A. – DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AGREEMENT,
EXHIBIT
B,
at
4
(Jan.
6,
2014),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/January14/JPMCDPASupportingDocs/JPMC%20DPA%
20Packet%20(Fully%20Executed%20w%20Exhibits).pdf.
74. Id.
75. Louis R. Davis & Linus Wilson, Estimating JP Morgan Chases’ Profits from the Madoff
Deposits, 14 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 1, 107–19 (2011).
76. Douglas, supra note 72.
77. Hamblett, supra note 70.
78. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Ben Protess & David Barboza, Hiring in China by JPMorgan
Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2013, 8:01 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/17/hiringin-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/?ref=todayspaper&_r=0 (reporting on the opening of an
investigation by the SEC).
79. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, Chinese Official Made Job Plea to JPMorgan
Chase Chief, DEALBOOK (Feb. 9, 2014, 10:06 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/02/09/chinese-
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one commentator observed in response to the reports, “opaque hiring
practices and nepotism can be a symptom of a poor compliance culture
at a company.” 80
JP Morgan was not unique in its involvement in these various types of
wrongdoing. Most if not all of the investigations and enforcement
actions detailed in this section involved multiple financial institutions.
As commentators have noted, the big banks have been repeat offenders,
both with respect to financial fraud and broader types of misconduct,81
and the financial crisis focused regulator attention on uncovering and
addressing this activity. JP Morgan’s actions, as described in this
article, are not exceptional but illustrative.
III. PUBLICNESS AND SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT
A. Corporate Publicness
The focus on JP Morgan and its wrongdoing by regulators,
policymakers and the press, and the demand for accountability in terms
of the pursuit of enforcement actions and the imposition of fines and
penalties can be understood as a response to JP Morgan’s “publicness.”
Publicness reflects the public’s awareness of and concern about JP
Morgan’s misconduct. It also reflects an understanding that JP
Morgan’s misconduct was not a private matter between the company
and its shareholders but had a broad effect on consumers, customers, the
bond markets, the energy markets, interest rates, regulators and more.
Corporations in general, and financial firms in particular, have
experienced increased publicness since the financial crisis of 2008, as
policymakers and ordinary citizens came to recognize the widespread
impact that corporate misconduct can have on the affairs of nonshareholder stakeholders and the broader economy.
The publicness view of the corporation is not new.
Early
corporations prior to the industrial revolution were viewed with great
distrust, precisely because of their capacity to inflict substantial harm. 82
official-made-job-plea-to-jpmorgan-chase-chief/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
80. Alexandra Wrage, Cautionary Tale: U.S. Bribery Probe Into JP Morgan's Hiring Practices
(Aug.
20,
2013,
10:29
AM),
In
China,
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexandrawrage/2013/08/20/cautionary-tale-u-s-bribery-probe-into-jpmorgans-hiring-practices-in-china/.
81. See Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/in-sec-fraud-cases-banks-makeand-break-promises.html?_r=0 (explaining that “nearly all of the biggest financial companies” are
“repeat offender[s]”).
82. See Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: An Approach to
Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587 (1991).
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Fear of corporate power led to limitations on which businesses would be
permitted to operate in the corporate form as well as restrictions on
corporate size, powers and duration. 83 Early debates about the
regulation of the railroads, the adoption of the federal antitrust laws in
response to the merger boom of the late 1900s, and the longstanding
restrictions on corporate political activity prior to the Court’s decision in
Citizens United, 84 were all based on the publicness of the corporation. 85
The public impact of the corporation was also a key factor in the
adoption of the federal securities laws.86 Congress identified the
rationale for the legislation in section 2 of the Securities & Exchange
Act of 1934, explaining that “transactions in securities . . . are effected
with a national public interest” and that “national emergencies, which
produce widespread unemployment . . . and adversely affect the general
welfare, are precipitated, intensified and prolonged by [misconduct in
the securities markets].”
Publicness has a distinctive legal definition within the framework of
federal securities regulation. Under federal law, a corporation can
become a “public company” in one of three ways—raising capital in the
public markets, listing on a national securities exchange or becoming
sufficiently large in terms of asset size and shareholder base.87
Becoming a public company has several consequences. Public
companies must make periodic disclosures to the SEC and to
shareholders, which include annual reports, quarterly reports and 8-Ks.
Public companies are subject to the federal proxy rules and the
restrictions of the Williams Act in the event of a takeover. Officers,
directors and 10% shareholders of public companies are subject to
Section 16(b) restriction on short swing trading.
Although securities regulation of public companies initially focused
primarily if not exclusively on investor protection and capital market

83. See, e.g., Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 567 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(describing historical limitations on the use of the corporate form and warning of the “social
significance” and potential harm from “removing all limitations upon the size and activities of business
corporations”); Charles Yablon, The Historical Race Competition for Corporate Charters and the Rise
and Decline of New Jersey: 1880-1910, 2007 J. CORP. L. 323, 359 (“Prior to 1899, Delaware had one of
the most restrictive incorporation statutes in the country. Charters could only be granted by judicial
order, and there were limitations on the duration, amount of capital, and purposes for which a
corporation could be formed”).
84. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
85. See, e.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding
regulation of corporate political speech based on the compelling interest in preventing its “corrosive and
distorting effects”).
86. See Jonathan Glater, Private Offerings and Public Ends: Reconsidering the Regime for
Classification of Investors under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(describing legislative history of the federal securities laws).
87. Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 351.
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development, some commentators have convincingly argued that
modern securities regulation has moved from private to public law as it
looks to address the effect of public companies on broader social,
political and economic interests. 88 Early evidence of this shift came
with Congress’ adoption of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in
1977 in which Congress prohibited public corporations from paying
bribes to foreign officials. 89 Although the prohibition of bribes did not
directly further shareholder interests (and may in fact have damaged
those interests by making US corporations less competitive overseas),
Congress situated the prohibition in the federal securities laws and
vested authority over its enforcement in the SEC. 90
The corporate governance scandals in Enron and WorldCom
generated a public reaction and a regulatory response in the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley). 91
Above the reforms
implemented by Sarbanes-Oxley were greater oversight over financial
reporting and the creation of a new regulator to supervise the accounting
industry, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).92
Like the FCPA, Sarbanes-Oxley was a response to the perceived
“publicness” of large public companies and, in particular, a perception
of the need to regulate such companies because of the broad “public”
effects of their conduct. 93 A similar pattern can be seen in the
requirements imposed by Dodd-Frank on corporate disclosure of their
use of corporate minerals 94 and resources extraction. 95
88. Id.at 372. See also id. at 342 (describing one objective of contemporary securities regulation
as focused on responsibility and accountability beyond shareholders and to society more generally).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2006). See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 373.
90. Cf. Barbara Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global
Corruption Is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093 (2012) (arguing that the target of
the FCPA, combatting bribery, is not properly part of the SEC’s mission of protecting investors).
91. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.); see also Sale, Public Governance, supra note 14, at 881
(identifying roots of publicness in the scandals involving Enron and other companies and noting changes
adopted by the Model Business Corporation Act in response).
92. For a general analysis of the PCAOB and congressional authority to create it, see Donna
Nagy, Playing Peekaboo with Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and its Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 975 (2009).
93. See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 13, at 340 (describing the “effort to create more
accountability of large, economically powerful business institutions that is only loosely coupled with
orthodox (and arguably more measurable) notions of investor protection.”).
94. See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56274, 2012 WL 3611799 (Sept. 12, 2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-12/pdf/2012-21153.pdf. In particular, Dodd-Frank’s new
disclosure requirements with respect to public companies’ use of conflict minerals and resource
extraction reflect a similar conception of publicness. In Dodd-Frank, Congress required public
companies to investigate the extent to which their product use conflict minerals—gold tantalum, tin and
tungsten, and to disclose the results of that investigation. Id. Although the requirement is framed as part
of public company reporting, commentators have observed that this disclosure does not appear to be
targeted toward investor or capital market protection. See also Jenna Greene, D.C. Circuit Panel
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B. Shareholder Empowerment as a Response to Publicness
The failures at Enron, WorldCom and other companies at the end of
the dot com bubble were another example of corporate publicness, as the
public was treated to media reports detailing the effect of the failures not
just on stockholders but on employees and communities. 96 The public
nature of these failures generated a demand for accountability, and many
corporate executives were criminally prosecuted for their role in the
scandals. 97
The scandals were also widely denounced as a failure of corporate
governance. 98 In response, commentators and policymakers sought to
reform corporate governance by increasing shareholder empowerment. 99
The settlement agreement in the reorganization of WorldCom/MCI
reflects this shareholder empowerment approach to governance

Hammers
Conflict
Mineral
Rule,
THE
LIT.
DAILY
(Jan.
8,
2014),
http://www.litigationdaily.com/id=1202637092964/DC-Circuit-Panel-Hammers-Conflict-MineralsRule?slreturn=20150401150207 (reporting on oral argument before DC Circuit, in which SEC Assistant
General Counsel Tracey Hardin conceded that providing investor protection was not the main point of
the rule); Nat’l Assn. of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing “Congress’s
judgment that supply-chain transparency would promote peace and stability by reducing the flow of
money to armed groups”).
95. Congress required the SEC to adopt a rule mandating disclosure of government payments
made by US public companies in connection with the commercial development of oil, natural gas, or
minerals. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1504, 22 U.S.C. § 286tt
(2012). See Disclosure of Payments by Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365 (Aug. 22,
2012), available at www.sec.gov/rules/final/2012/34-67717.pdf. According to the SEC, “Congress
intended that [the rule] would increase the accountability of governments to their citizens in resourcerich countries for the wealth generated by those resources.” Id. In adopting the rule, the SEC explicitly
observed that the social benefit contemplated by Congress “differs from the investor protection benefits
that our rules typically strive to achieve.” Id.
96. See, e.g., Rick Bragg, ENRON'S COLLAPSE: WORKERS; Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs And
Added Sting of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/us/enron-scollapse-workers-workers-feel-pain-layoffs-added-sting-betrayal.html (describing how Enron’s collapse
caused 4000 employees to lose their jobs).
97. See, e.g., Alexei Barriionuevo, Enron Chiefs Guilty of Fraud and Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES
(May 26, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/25/business/25cnd-enron.html?pagewanted=all
(reporting on jury conviction of Enron executives Kenneth Lay and Jerry Skilling).
98. See, e.g., Patty M. DeGaetano, The Shareholder Direct Access Teeter-Totter: Will Increased
Shareholder Voice in the Director Nomination Process Protect Investors?, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 361, 365
(2005) (“Enron was the first in the string of recent corporate scandals that have highlighted the systemic
corporate governance failures in America.”); see also, Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown
of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 137 (2006)
(identifying other contemporaneous accounting scandals and describing claims that these scandals were
due to a lack of effective board oversight).
99. See, e.g., Judy Warner, 10 Years After Sox: The Legacy of Enron, NAT’L ASS’N OF
CORPORATE
DIRECTORS
(Sep.
26,
2012),
https://www.nacdonline.org/Magazine/Article.cfm?ItemNumber=8951 (citing ISS counsel Patrick
McGurn as stating that the “more important [governance changes] are the changes that have empowered
shareholders”).
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reform. 100 In the report, Corporate Monitor Richard Breeden proposed
78 corporate governance reforms, all of which MCI accepted. 101 The
governance reforms included substantial new rights and powers for
WorldCom shareholders, such as the right to propose shareholder
resolutions even if those resolutions did not meet the requirements under
SEC Rule 14a-8, the right to fill board vacancies, propose candidates for
director elections and have a genuine choice of director nominees.102
Significantly, the Report explained a fundamental component of the
shareholder empowerment approach: “Rather than more regulation to
protect shareholders, these recommendations seek to give more power to
shareholders to protect themselves.” 103
The trend to increase shareholder empowerment in the name of
improved corporate governance has continued. Lucian Bebchuk
published his widely cited defense of shareholder empowerment in
2005. 104 Shareholder empowerment figured prominently in the
Committee on Capital Markets Regulation’s law reform agenda in
2006. 105 The Committee’s Report devoted an entire section to
improving shareholder rights, focusing on such issues as allowing
shareholders authority over the adoption of takeover defenses, majority
voting, and proxy access. 106 Many commentators have similarly
characterized the 2008 financial crisis as a corporate governance
failure. 107
The calls for increased shareholder empowerment have been
effective. Many issuers have eliminated classified boards in favor of

100. RICHARD C. BREEDEN, REPORT TO THE HON. JED S. RAKOFF, THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE FUTURE OF
MCI, INC. (2003), available at http://www.law.du.edu/images/uploads/restoring-trust.pdf [hereinafter
RESTORING TRUST].
101. Id.; see also WorldCom's revenge, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 29, 2003),
http://www.economist.com/node/2024897.
102. RESTORING TRUST, supra note 100 at 3.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833
(2005)
105. See INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION 93 (2006),
available at http://capmktsreg.org/app/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-InterimReport.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT]; see William B. Bratton & Michel Wachter, The
Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 655 (2010) (describing the
Committee’s defense of shareholder empowerment).
106. CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 105, at 93 (“The strength of shareholder rights in
publicly traded firms directly affects the health and efficient functioning of U.S. capital markets.”).
107. See, e.g., JAMES P. HAWLEY, SHYAM J. KAMATH, & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE FAILURES THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
(2011); HAMID MEHRAN, ET AL., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BANKS: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED
FROM
THE
FINANCIAL
CRISIS?
(2011),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr502.pdf.
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annual elections, 108 shifted from plurality to majority voting standards109
and increased the degree to which corporate boards are independent of
management. 110 Investors have enjoyed growing success in persuading
boards to adopt poison pills that require a shareholder vote for their
adoption or extension, or to eliminate poison pills entirely. Shareholders
have also sought to exercise greater influence in operational decisions.
Most recently, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens
United, 111 shareholders have introduced proposals seeking greater
disclosure or control over corporate political spending. 112
In Dodd-Frank, Congress sought to harness the growth in shareholder
power not just to improve management accountability to shareholders,
but toward a broader public objective. Accountability, under DoddFrank, is no longer just about making boards faithful agents of the
shareholders; it is also about making corporations more responsible
public actors. Although several aspects of Dodd-Frank illustrate the
shift, 113 this essay will focus on Dodd-Frank’s treatment of executive
compensation and, in particular, the implementation of “Say on Pay.”
The efficacy of using shareholders as a vehicle to addressing
corporate publicness raises several considerations. First, shareholder
empowerment might be defended on the basis that it is less intrusive
than direct regulation. Shareholder empowerment is a form of private
ordering. 114 Changes implemented through private ordering are more
flexible than those imposed through regulation, enabling individual
firms to tailor those changes to their specific needs rather than adhering
to the dictates of a mandatory one-size-fits-all rule. 115 Private ordering
108. See, e.g., 121 Companies Agreed to Move towards Annual Elections, HARVARD
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROJECT, http://srp.law.harvard.edu/companies-entering-into-agreements.shtml
(last visited May 20, 2015) (explaining that 121 companies shifted from staggered boards to annual
election of directors in response to shareholder proposals submitted by the project).
109. See Choi, Fisch, Kahan, & Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?,
(forthcoming 2015) (providing statistics on the shift from plurality to majority voting at S&P 1500
firms).
110. See, e.g., Jeffrey Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 19502005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (detailing the shift
from insider-dominated to largely independent boards of directors).
111. Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
112. See Corporate Political Spending: A Resource, THE CONFERENCE BOARD,
https://www.conference-board.org/politicalspending/ (last updated Jan. 14, 2015) (describing increased
use of shareholder proposals “on the topic of corporate political activity”).
113. See notes 94 and 95, supra, and accompanying text. (describing conflict minerals and
resource extraction rules).
114. See Jill Fisch, The Destructive Ambiguity of Federal Proxy Access, 61 EMORY LJ. 435, 440
n. 17 (2012) (explaining concept of private ordering).
115. See, e.g., Troy Paredes, Comm’r, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Statement at Open Meeting to
Propose Amendments Regarding Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations (May 20, 2009),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch052009tap.htm (defending private ordering
over a mandatory approach as enabling greater flexibility for firm-specific tailoring).
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also reduces the risk of regulatory error— market forces can discipline
firms that adopt value-decreasing approaches.
In addition, shareholder empowerment offers a mechanism for
harnessing a range of views. As Lisa Fairfax has explained, public
company shareholders hold a range of divergent interests—including
their time horizon, the extent to which they focus on financial return,
and the extent to which they are concerned with the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders. 116 Public company shareholders may include
hedge funds, retail investors, social investors and union pension funds—
enabling shareholder action to provide input on a variety of public and
social values. Fairfax has demonstrated that shareholder efforts to
advance a variety of social and public objectives have been successful in
influencing corporate policy. 117
There are limitations to relying on shareholders as agents of
publicness however. The most important limitation is that of capacity.
Shareholders have limited information about the corporations in which
they invest and limited expertise in operational decision-making.118
Shareholders often engage in herding— following the lead of an activist
hedge fund with respect to a financial transaction or demanding high
profile governance reforms despite the absence of empirical support for
their efficacy. 119 Shareholders may also rely excessively on the advice
of third party intermediaries such as Institutional Shareholder Services.
A more serious problem with relying on shareholder empowerment is
that shareholders are imperfect agents for the public generally.
Shareholder interests are not always aligned with those of other
stakeholders or the public more generally. 120 Specifically, shareholders
are likely to place greater weight on profit maximization than other
stakeholders. 121 In addition, because most shareholders are diversified,
they may have a greater tolerance for risky operational decisions, which
also result in higher average returns, than non-shareholder
stakeholders. 122

116. Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
53, 83–85 (2008).
117. See id. at 93.
118. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 105, at 695–97 (describing how information asymmetries
make it difficult for investors to evaluate managerial decisions through stock price reactions).
119. See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable
Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001) (finding that institutional
activism has little or no effect on targeted firms’ performance).
120. See Fairfax, supra note 116, at 100–01.
121. Id.
122. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 105, at 723.
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IV. SHAREHOLDER EMPOWERMENT AND EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
Policymakers have identified various concerns with the amount123
and structure of executive compensation for many years, and they have
sought to address those concerns through a wide range of approaches.124
Commentators disagree about the extent to which existing pay levels
and practices are problematic, the nature of those problems and the
feasibility of proffered solutions. 125
In responding to these concerns, Dodd-Frank enacted a series of new
requirements applicable to public companies. These include disclosure
requirements—issuers are required to provide a variety of new
compensation-related disclosures including the extent to which
executive pay is tied to performance, 126 the ratio between the CEO’s
compensation and that of the median employee, 127 potential conflicts of
interest involving compensation consultants 128 and the degree to which
employees are permitted to hedge investments in the company’s
stock. 129 In addition Dodd-Frank required public companies to conduct
a periodic advisory shareholder vote on executive compensation (Say on
Pay) and golden parachutes. 130
Although one concern about executive compensation is the agency
problem, 131 the compensation reforms speak to broader concerns,
including excessive concentration of wealth, 132 the potential that

123. CEO pay, in particular, has grown dramatically. CEO pay grew about 875% from 1978 to
2012. See Lawrence Mishel & Natalie Sabadish, CEO Pay in 2012 Was Extraordinarily High Relative
to Typical Workers and Other High Earners, ECON. POL’Y INST., June 26, 2013, at 2, available at
http://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.epi.org/files/2013/ceo-pay-2012-extraordinarilyhigh.pdf&hl=en_US&embedded=true/ (the average CEO of a top 350 firm received $14.1 million in
compensation in 2012, including exercised stock options).
124. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004) (identifying agency problems in
executive compensation; Jill E. Fisch, Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder
Litigation, 34 GA L. REV. 745, 761–62 (2000) (describing the federal government's efforts to address
excesses in executive compensation through various tax and disclosure requirements).
125. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 748–49 (2013).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012).
127. Id.
128. Id. § 78j-3.
129. Id. § 78n.
130. Id. § 78n-1.
131. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003).
132. The pay ratio requirement, for example, was triggered by the dramatically growing disparity
between CEO pay and that of the average worker. In 1980, the ratio of top executive to factory worker
pay was 42 to 1. See Jennifer Liberto, CEO Pay is 380 Times Average Worker's - AFL-CIO, CNN
MONEY (Apr. 19, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/04/19/news/economy/ceo-pay/; see also Michael
Hiltzik, CEO-to-worker pay gap is obscene; want to know how obscene?, LA TIMES (Oct. 20, 2013),
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executive pay practices reduce managerial incentives to invest in
productivity and training, and the relationship of executive pay
structures to risky business decisions. 133 The Occupy Wall Street
movement, for example, one of the most visible critics of executive
compensation, argues that high levels of executive pay hurt the 99
percent—the average worker, not the average shareholder. 134
In implementing its new regulatory requirements, Congress may have
been focused primarily on shareholder interests, despite the broad focus
of the new reforms. Congress may instead have been seeking to
generate disclosure that would be broadly available to the general public
in the hopes that customers and citizens more generally might use this
information to pressure executives to change their behavior. An
alternative interpretation of the requirements is as a mechanism for
harnessing shareholder voice in the broader public interest. Congress
may have intended investors who learn of a company’s behavior through
these new provisions to exercise traditional shareholder tools to pressure
the company to change its policy—selling their stock, introducing
shareholder proposals or voting against directors who fail to effect
change. Say-on-Pay—a mandated non-binding shareholder vote on the
corporation’s compensation package—goes further and creates a
discrete tool for this exercise of shareholder power. Say-on-Pay thus
enlists shareholders to serve as an agent of social change.
A. The Early Experience with Say on Pay
Early experience with Say-on-Pay provides an opportunity to
consider the effectiveness of the shareholder empowerment approach.
Experience with Say-on-Pay is, of course, limited. Only three (and a
half) seasons of annual meetings have occurred since the adoption of the
SEC’s implementing rule. 135 So far, however, it is unclear that
affording shareholder voting power over executive compensation has
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-hiltzik-20131020,0,770122.column (in 2012, the ratio of CEO to
average worker pay was about 350 to 1); Elliot Blair Smith & Phil Kuntz, CEO Pay 1,795-to-1 Multiple
of Wages Skirts U.S. Law, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 30, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0430/ceo-pay-1-795-to-1-multiple-of-workers-skirts-law-as-sec-delays.html (At some companies, it is far
higher. Former JC Penney CEO Ron Johnson’s pay package in 2011 was 1795 times that of an average
JC Penney employee.).
133. See, e.g., Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The Effects
of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1055 (2007)
(finding, in study of 950 US CEOs, that CEOS with a large quantity of stock options make bigger but
riskier bets in their operational decisions).
134. William Lazonick, How High CEO Pay Hurts the 99 Percent, OCCUPYWALLSTREET.NET,
http://occupywallstreet.net/story/how-high-ceo-pay-hurts-99-percent (last visited Oct. 17, 2014).
135. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, 76
Fed. Reg. 6010, 6011, 6012 (Feb. 2, 2011).
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been effective in addressing the public values of reducing high pay
levels, the increasing concentration of wealth or the limited connection
between pay levels and performance.
First, failed Say-on-Pay votes have been rare. Voting results have
remained fairly consistent over the past four years—on average more
than 90% of shareholder votes have been cast in favor of the plan, and
compensation plans at approximately 2% of companies have failed
receive majority approval. 136 In light of the widespread claims about
problematic compensation packages, one would have expected to see a
far higher percentage of votes cast against such packages.
Second, the evidence suggests that executive pay levels have not
decreased since the adoption of say on pay; if anything, they have
increased. 137 In addition, although shareholders and proxy advisors
appear highly focused on pay for performance, recent data suggests that
the connection between CEO compensation and stock performance
remains weak. 138 Say on pay votes do not differ at companies that
create shareholder value versus those that destroy value. 139 Perhaps
more importantly, current incentive-based pay structures do not appear
to be correlated with better future performance. 140 A recent large-scale
study, for example, found that incentive-based compensation is
negatively correlated with both stock price and operating performance.
The more corporate CEOs are paid, the worse their companies perform
in the future. 141 Another study found that, although issuers appear to be
restructuring their compensation packages in an effort to win
shareholder support, the changes do not appear to increase firm
value. 142 Finally, US income inequality continues to rise, with one
136. See 2014 Say on Pay Voting Results, STEVEN HALL & PARTNERS (Dec. 31, 2014),
http://www.shallpartners.com/our-thinking/short-takes/2014-say-on-pay-voting-results/ (reporting say
on pay results for 2014 at 3045 issuers); Fisch, supra note 125, at 756 (reporting similar voting results
for 2011 and 2012).
137. See, e.g., David Larcker et al., Ten Myths of 'Say on Pay' 1-2 (Rock Center for Corporate
Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. CGRP-26, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=209470410.
138. Eric Chemi & Ariana Giorgi, The Pay-for-Performance Myth, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(July 22, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-22/for-ceos-correlation-between-payand-stock-performance-is-pretty-random.
139. MARK VAN CLIEAF & KAREL LEEFLANG, THE ALIGNMENT GAP BETWEEN SAY ON PAY
VOTING AND CREATING VALUE 6 (2014), available at irrcinstitute.org/pdf/final-sop-dec-2014.pdf
(finding “no large Say-on-Pay voting differences (FOR vs. AGAINST) for subsets of companies which
created value versus those that destroyed value over five years”).
140. Michael J. Cooper, et al., Performance for Pay? The Relation Between CEO Incentive
Compensation and Future Stock Price Performance, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Oct. 1, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1572085.
141. See id. at 28 (reporting that CEOs that accepted the highest levels of incentive compensation
underperformed in terms of both stock and operating performance).
142. See David F. Larcker, et al., Outsourcing Shareholder Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms 3

672

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 83

researcher reporting that, during the economic recovery from 2009 to
2012, the top 1% captured 95% of the income gains. 143
These results should not be surprising. As Bill Bratton and Michael
Wachter explain, a shareholder empowerment model of the firm “sends
management a simple instruction: in all circumstances, manage to
maximize the market price of the stock.” 144 JP Morgan—and other
financial firms in the 2000s—got that message. 145 The move to
increasingly risky business decisions that offered the potential for high
upside rewards in stock price but also the potential for massive loses,
was the result.
Ironically, shareholder empowerment, rather than operating as a
solution, appears to be a contributing cause of problematic business
practices in general, and excessive risk in particular. In one recent
study, scholars examine the effect of shareholder empowerment at banks
during the financial crisis. The study finds that banks with greater
shareholder empowerment were more likely to be bailed out. 146
Another recent study seeks to determine whether the size and
structure of executive pay—issues that are targeted in say on pay
votes—were correlated with economic performance of the big banks
during the financial crisis. 147 The study, which looked at 95 big banks,
found that, prior to the adoption say on pay, the compensation of big
bank executives was already performance based and structured in a way
that closely aligned the interests of the executives with those of
shareholders. Counter-intuitively, however, a closer alignment did not
appear to improve the banks’ performance during the financial crisis. If
anything, good governance appears to have adversely affected the
banks’ performance. As the authors explain: “there is no evidence that
banks with CEOs whose incentives were less well aligned with the
(Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University, Working Paper No. 119, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101453 (finding that companies that amend their executive
compensation plans to avoid a negative recommendation from proxy advisory firms exhibit statistically
significant negative stock price returns on the date these changes are disclosed).
143. EMMANUEL SAEZ, STRIKING IT RICHER: THE EVOLUTION OF TOP INCOMES IN THE UNITED
STATES (2013), available at http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf.
144. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 105 at 658–59.
145. Id. at 718-19 (Bratton & Wachter offer the example of Countrywide, which enjoyed
impressive stock price returns prior the financial crisis as it expanded into increasingly risky strategies);
see also Shawn Tully, Meet the 23,000% Stock, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 2003, at 204, available at
http://archive.fortune.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2003/09/15/349151/index.htm (between
1982 and 2003, Countrywide had the best stock price performance of any Fortune 500 Company,
returning 23,000% on its equity). As we now know, those same risks led Countrywide into failure.
146. Daniel Ferreira et al., Shareholder Empowerment and Bank Bailouts 2 (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 345/2013, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170392.
147. Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 99 J. FIN.
ECON. 11 (2011) (observing that regulatory reforms were aimed at increasing the alignment of executive
pay with performance and giving shareholders more voice).
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interests of their shareholders performed worse during the crisis.”148
Moreover “[s]ome evidence shows that banks led by CEOs whose
interests were better aligned with those of their shareholders had worse
stock returns and a worse return on equity.” 149
To the extent that aligning executive compensation with stock price
creates an incentive for excessive risk-taking, Say on Pay exacerbates
this problem by tying a general concern about shareholder value to a
specific stick—the threat of a negative vote on executive pay packages
that do not demonstrate a sufficient correlation between executive pay
and stock price.
As Bratton and Wachter observe, although
compensation offers a promising governance tool for restructuring
management incentives, shareholder empowerment does not enhance
that promise and, instead, may “get in the way.” 150
Even if shareholders attempted to cast their Say-on-Pay votes in
accordance with general societal interests, the effectiveness of such
efforts would be limited for several reasons. The compensation
disclosure mandated by Dodd-Frank and the SEC’s implementing rules
is lengthy and complex, 151 and investors have limited capacity to
evaluate and analyze it. 152 BlackRock, for example, one of the largest
institutional investors, voted shares at 14,872 shareholder meetings
worldwide in 2012, including almost 3,800 in the United
States. 153 Although BlackRock has an unusually large staff of
approximately twenty people to make voting decisions, that staff’s
ability to review detailed compensation information for
thousands of companies is limited. As a result, BlackRock relies
on proxy advisory services such as ISS and Glass Lewis to collect
148. Id. at 24.
149. Id. at 12-13 (the authors found that a one standard deviation increase in the dollar incentives
derived from a CEO’s holdings of stock and stock options in 2006 was correlated with a lower return on
equity of 10.5 percentage points in 2008).
150. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 105, at 662.
151. See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., NOTICE OF 2013 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
PROXY
STATEMENTS
(Apr.
10,
2013),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000001961713000255/jpmc2013definitiveproxysta.htm
(JP Morgan, for example, devoted 22 pages of its 2013 proxy statement to executive compensation
disclosure which included information about compensation levels and structure, the firm’s compensation
principles and practices, stock options, change of control benefits, and policies on hedging).
152. A further problem is that the compensation disclosure mandated in the proxy statement, and
on which shareholders vote, discloses prospective compensation but, because 75% of executive
compensation is performance-based, the actual pay received will vary from this disclosure depending on
the company’s operating results. See Larcker, supra note 137, at 3 (“in 2011, the median expected value
of CEO compensation among large U.S. corporations differed from the median earned value by $2
million, or 18 percent”).
153. Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2003),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/business/blackrock-a-shareholding-giant-is-quietlystirring.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
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and summarize information from the proxy statement. 154
Other investors with more limiting staffing and funding for corporate
governance rely more heavily on proxy advisors. In some cases
investors explicitly authorize the proxy advisors to vote their shares in
accordance with the advisors’ recommendations. 155 Investors rely on
proxy advisory firms for both information and advice because they may
lack sufficient expertise to evaluate the quality and structure of a firm’s
compensation package. In addition, use of proxy advisors is often less
costly than analyzing corporate pay practices internally.
Relying on proxy advisors carries its own problems. Critics of proxy
advisory firms have observed that proxy advisors are virtually
unregulated, have no investment in the companies they are evaluating
and, in some cases, are subject to conflicts of interest. 156 Proxy advisors
may also have limited expertise in evaluating executive pay practices.157
Although a complete analysis of proxy advisor recommendations is
beyond the scope of this essay, two points are worth noting. First, pay
structure is not a one-size-fits-all proposition. Different companies
operate very differently, and a plan that is ideal for one may be
inappropriate for another. Yet ISS’s evaluation of executive pay takes a
largely standardized approach to compensation both in the metrics for
evaluating pay levels and pay structure and in the rejection of certain
forms of non-standard compensation. 158 Institutional endorsement of
this approach creates the potential for “homogenization” of executive
pay packages. 159 In turn, this reduces the willingness of firms to
154. Id.
155. See Larcker, supra note 137, at 12, exhibit 6 (listing thirteen firms that followed ISS negative
say on pay recommendations in 2011 more than 96.7% of the time; but see Choi et al., Who Calls the
Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35 (2013) (questioning
extent to which mutual funds blindly follow ISS recommendations with respect to director elections).
156. See Daniel M. Gallagher, Outsized Power & Influence: The Role of Proxy Advisers 8
(Washington
Legal Foundation, Working Paper No. 187, 2014), available at
www.wlf.org/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/GallagherWP8-14.pdf (summarizing criticisms).
157. See Evaluating the ISS Test of CEO Pay for Performance for Say-on-Pay Votes, PAY
GOVERNANCE, http://paygovernance.com/evaluating-the-iss-test-of-ceo-pay-for-performance-for-sayon-pay-votes/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (criticizing ISS failure to use realizable pay in evaluating pay
for performance and reporting that, when realizable pay is substituted, more than 10% of issuers for
which ISS had found a misalignment “had realizable pay that was actually aligned with performance.”).
Notably, however, ISS has repeatedly responded to criticisms of its methodology. See, e.g., CAROL
BOWIE, EVALUATING PAY FOR PERFORMANCE ALIGNMENT ISS’ QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE
APPROACH
(2014),
available
at
http://www.issgovernance.com/sites/default/files/EvaluatingPayForPerformance.pdf (updating ISS
approach to include calculation and use of “realizable pay”).
158. See Larcker, supra note 137, at 10 (observing that proxy advisors typically recommend
against a plan that includes nonstandard benefits “such as tax-gross up payments, personal use of
corporate aircraft, and large golden parachute payments or supplemental pension programs,” but
explaining that such benefits can be economically justified in particular cases).
159. See Homogenization of Executive Pay Plans: The Unintended Consequences of Say on Pay
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experiment with different pay structures and engage in the type of
individualized firm tailoring that may be value increasing. 160
Second, ISS’s conception of performance-based pay 161 relies
exclusively on two measures of performance —pay relative to peers and
pay relative to total shareholder return or TSR. 162 Shareholders demand
performance-based compensation as an essential tool in creating
appropriate incentives for appropriate managerial decision-making and
have focused on linking pay TSR in particular as an essential
consideration in evaluating pay plans, in part because TSR is the most
important performance metric from a shareholder perspective. 163
Incentive-based compensation is obviously desirable, but the
selection of appropriate metrics for measuring executive performance is
necessary for performance-based pay to encourage appropriate decisionmaking. In particular linking executive pay too closely to stock price
performance is potentially problematic for the same reason that
traditional stock options were—it creates an incentive to take excessive
risks because of the correlation between risk and stock market return.164
As Exxon Mobil’s Compensation Committee recently explained:
We concluded that a formula based approach that relies heavily on
one- or three-year total shareholder return could encourage
inappropriate risk taking and have a lasting and negative impact on
ExxonMobil’s business by encouraging a focus on more immediate
results at the expense of our long-term business model. 165
In sum, determining the appropriate size and structure of
executive pay packages, like many corporate decisions, is a
Votes, PAY GOVERNANCE, http://paygovernance.com/homogenization-of-executive-pay-plans-theunintended-consequences-of-say-on-pay-votes-2/ (last visited May 1, 2015) (describing the
homogenization of pay plans).
160. See id. (observing the need for plans to be tailored to a particular firm’s business strategy).
161. Time-based awards (including standard stock options and time-vesting stock awards) that are
not granted due to the attainment of pre-set goals are not considered strongly performance-based in this
context.
162. Bowie, supra note 157.
163. JAMES F. REDA & DAVID M. SCHMIDT, THE X FACTOR: WHAT LTI MEASURES DRIVE
CORPORATE
PERFORMANCE?
(2014),
available
at
http://www.compasstr.com/uploads/
2/6/1/1/26115423/the_x_factor_-_what_lti_measures_drive_corporate_performance.pdf; see also Facts
Behind 2013 "Turnaround" Success for Say on Pay Votes, GEORGESON REPORT (Aug. 28, 2013),
available at http://hosted.verticalresponse.com/221914/687da05d2a/ (explaining that improved TSR
performance is a critical factor explaining the success of companies that have turned around their say on
pay votes).
164. See, e.g., Sydney Finkelstein, Rethinking CEO Stock Options, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr.
17,
2009),
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2009-04-17/rethinking-ceo-stockoptionsbusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice (explaining that “Stock options
have turned out to be incredible engines of risk-taking”).
165. EXXONMOBIL, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION OVERVIEW 8 (2013), available at
www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/news_pub_ir_execcomp2013.pdf.
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complex task. It requires a significant amount of information and
analysis and that is also informed by the desired objectives—
whether those objectives are maximizing firm value, increasing
long term growth and sustainability or alleviating wealth and
income disparities in society. Although the role of shareholder
voting in making those determinations continues to evolve, there is
little evidence to date that shareholder empowerment has addressed
the perceived shortcomings.
B. Shareholder Empowerment and Compensation at JP Morgan
The mess at Morgan offers a concrete example of the role of
shareholder empowerment in addressing compensation and, in
particular, the incentives for risk-taking that can be created by the
structure of executive pay packages. The Senate Report carefully
examined the level and structure of the pay of the key executives at the
CIO and found that they were highly compensated for the SCP’s trading
activities. 166 For example, Ina Drew, head of the CIO received
compensation of $14 million in 2011 and $15 million in 2010, 167 at the
same time that the New York Times reported median CEO pay in 2010
of only $9.6 million.168 Drew was the third-highest compensated
executive at JP Morgan in 2010.
Collectively, the seven employees in the CIO received a total of $105
million in compensation between 2010 and 2011, the years leading up to
the whale. 169 Achilles Macris, the International Chief Financial Officer,
Martin-Artajo and Iksil, the three employees most directly involved in
the whale, were among the most highly compensated employees at JP
Morgan. 170 According to the Senate Report, Macris received total
compensation of $14.5 million in 2011, Martin-Artajo received
compensation of almost $11 million, and Iksil was paid Iksil was paid
almost $7 million. 171 Because their compensation was so high, it was
reviewed directly by Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon. 172
166. Senate Report, supra note 17, at 59.
167. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., NOTICE OF 2012 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
PROXY
STATEMENTS
20
(Apr.
4,
2012),
available
at
http://investor.shareholder.com/common/download/download.cfm?companyid=ONE&fileid=556146&fi
lekey=e8b56256-365c-45aa-bbdb-3aa82f0d07ea&filename=JPMC_2012_proxy_statement.pdf.
168. Daniel Costello, The Drought Is Over (at Least for C.E.O.’s), N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/business/10comp.html?_r=1&ref=todayspaper
169. Shanny Basar, London Whale Seven Received $105m Over Two Years, FIN. NEWS (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2013-03-15/senate-report-jp-morgan-london-whale-teampaid-105-m.
170. Senate Report, supra note 17, at 59.
171. Id. at 58.
172. Id. at 59.
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Why were the compensation levels so high? JP Morgan explained in
its 2011 Annual Report that Drew’s high compensation level was based
on her role in “creating shareholder value through risk management
activities.” 173 Yet, as the Senate Report found, the CIO was not engaged
in risk management but rather in risky derivatives trading. The Senate
found that, in fact, Marcis, Martin-Artajo and Iksil were all compensated
as investment bankers rather than as risk managers. The Report
observed “not only were the SCP employees compensated like
Investment Bank employees, but they were compensated at levels that
were at the top range of, or better than, the best Investment Bank
employees.” 174
Equally important was the structure of this compensation.
Specifically, the SCP’s employees’ compensation was linked to SCP
profits and to profits of the bank as a whole. 175 As a result, the Senate
Report concluded that the employees’ compensation structure created an
incentive for them to take excessive risks in an effort to generate profits
rather than an incentive to mitigate risk despite the potential losses that
might result from a risk mitigation strategy. 176
As the Senate Report noted: “Incentive-based compensation systems
are premised on the basic assumption that one of the factors that
influence individuals’ performance and conduct is financial reward.”177
Compensation that rewarded effective risk management would suggest
that the SCP functioned as a hedge, while compensation that rewarded
profitmaking would suggest that the SCP functioned more as a
proprietary trading operation. The compensation history for key
employees with responsibility for SCP trading suggests that “the bank
rewarded them for financial gain and risk-taking more than for effective
risk management.” 178
That this structure affected the behavior of the Morgan employees
cannot be doubted. The Senate Report found no explicit structures or
incentives designed to encourage risk management by CIO employees
and, in fact, the trading activities by the CIO in 2012 had nothing to do
with risk management. As the Report noted, with respect to CIO Chief
Investment Officer Drew, “policing risk conflicted with her interest in
generating gains.” 179
173. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., NOTICE OF 2011 ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS AND
PROXY
STATEMENTS
20
(Apr.
7,
2011,)
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/000119312511091290/ddef14a.htm#toc149447_10.
174. Senate Report, supra note 17, at 59.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 57.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 155.
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These compensation plans suggest a corporate governance failure.
Did shareholder empowerment help? Say-on-Pay focuses on the
compensation of the top five executives named in a corporation’s proxy
statement. 180 For JP Morgan, this did not include most of the employees
in the CIO. It did, however include CEO Jamie Dimon and CIO head
Ina Drew, who were two of the most highly compensated employees at
the entire company. Both Dimon’s compensation package and Drew’s
were explicitly disclosed to and approved by JP Morgan shareholders
pursuant to the Say-on-Pay rules. Before, during and after the whale
and the revelation of JP Morgan’s other problems, shareholders
continued to approve JP Morgan’s compensation packages
overwhelmingly. Shareholders approved the packages by votes of 96%
in 2009 and 2010, and a vote of 73% in 2011. 181 Even in May 2012
after news of the whale had begun to spread (although before the worst
of the losses and other problems had been revealed), shareholders
overwhelmingly approved JP Morgan’s executive compensation plan by
a vote of 91.5%. 182 In May 2013, shareholders approved the
compensation plan (which no longer included Ina Drew) by a vote of
92.2%, and in 2014, the plan (which included nearly doubling Jamie
Dimon’s pay) received the support of 77.9% of voting shareholders.183
Although the variation in the level of shareholder support may have
conveyed some dissatisfaction with the events described in this essay,
there has been no year in which approval of the pay package was in
jeopardy. 184
Nor did shareholders appear to hold Dimon accountable for a lack of
oversight. Following the financial crisis, shareholders and regulators
demanded that several large banks separate the positions of CEO and
Chairman of the Board. 185 Shareholders argued that this governance
change creates additional checks and balances to limit an unhealthy
concentration of power and constrain poor decision-making. 186 In
180. The vote applies to compensation disclosed as part of Item 402 of Regulation S-K.
181. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 167, at 20.
182. Dawn Kopecki & Christine Harper, JPMorgan Says 91.5% of Shareholders Approve Pay
Proposal, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-15/jpmorgan-says91-5-of-shareholders-approve-pay-proposal.html.
183. Emily Glazer, J.P. Morgan Holders Give Pay Plan Tepid OK, WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304422704579573922673276830.
184. Id. In contrast, former Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit was forced to leave his position after
shareholders rejected Citigroup’s executive compensation plan in 2012. Id.
185. Richard Leblanc, American Banks Should Split the Chair and CEO Roles, HUFFINGTON
POST BUSINESS, (April 16, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richard-leblanc/banks-chairceo_b_3071970.html.
186. Charles Tribbett, Splitting The CEO And Chairman Roles - Yes Or No?, RUSSEL REYNOLDS
ASSOCS. (Dec. 2012), http://www.russellreynolds.com/content/splitting-ceo-and-chairman-roles-yes-orno
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addition, some studies have found that CEO pay levels are higher at
companies that combine the Chair and CEO positions. 187
JP Morgan shareholders voted on a proposal to strip Dimon of his
dual positions in both 2012 and 2013. 188 In 2012, the vote failed,
receiving the support of 40% of the shares voted. 189 In 2013, after
revelation of the whale, Dimon’s widely quoted “tempest in a teapot”
statement and his highly publicized testimony before Congress, the
proposal to create an independent chairman received greater attention.190
Nonetheless, shareholder support for splitting the positions declined to
only 32%, a decline that was widely viewed as a victory for Dimon. 191
One possible explanation is that, from a shareholder perspective, the
damage in terms of JP Morgan’s publicness was less significant than the
firm’s financial performance. 192 Although the financial impact on
Morgan from the investigations, lawsuits and scandals has been
staggering, 193 the overall impact on Morgan’s financial performance has
been limited. More importantly, despite the public attention to its
wrongdoing, JP Morgan has maintained its primary focus on shareholder
value, as reflected in stock price.194 In a recently-released document, 195
JP Morgan explained that its compensation structure ensures that pay is
“integrally linked to shareholder value and safety and soundness.196
The document offers compelling evidence that Say-on-Pay at JP Morgan
is working just fine from a shareholder perspective yet, at the same time,
offers reasons to question its effectiveness in addressing corporate
publicness.
187. Id.
188. Dawn Kopecki & Hugh Son, Victory for Dimon as JPMorgan Shareholders Reject CEOChairman Split, BLOOMBERG (May 22, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-21/victoryfor-dimon-as-jpmorgan-shareholders-reject-ceo-chairman-split.html.
189. Id. (the full scale of the whale losses had not been disclosed as of the date of the 2012 annual
meeting, although Dimon had already admitted that the incident was a “terrible, egregious mistake.”);
see also Francine McKenna, Will 'Egregious' Error Sway the Say-on-Pay Vote at JPMorgan?,
AMERICAN BANKER (May 13, 2012), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/Jamie-Dimon-Say-onPay-JPM-1049266-1.html.
190. Kopecki & Son, supra note 188.
191. Id.
192. As Bloomberg observed, JP Morgan faced a “barrage” of investigations into its operations,
yet it had never earned more money than in 2012 and the first quarter of 2013. See Nick Summers,
Jamie Dimon Wins Big in JPMorgan Shareholder Vote, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 21, 2013),
http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-21/jamie-dimon-wins-big-in-jpmorgan-shareholdervote.
193. For example, in October 2013, the bank reported that it has set aside $23 billion in reserves.
The bank reported legal costs of $ 9.2 billion.
194. See JP MORGAN CHASE, HOW WE DO BUSINESS – THE REPORT (2014), available at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/ONE/3757111242x0x799950/14aa6d4f-f90d-4a23-96a653e5cc199f43/How_We_Do_Business.pdf.
195. See id. at 6 (explaining reasons for releasing the report).
196. See id. at 22–24 (emphasis added).
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Incidentally, shareholders appear to have viewed one component of
JP Morgan’s pay plan as problematic—the substantial discretion that the
board retains in awarding bonuses to its executives rather than relying
on pre-determined performance metrics. 197 ISS recommended a vote
against JP Morgan’s pay package in 2011 because of “the discretionary
nature of the Firm’s executive compensation program.” 198 This negative
recommendation likely played a role in the substantially lower vote in
favor that year. 199 Similarly in 2014, the Florida State Board of
Administration, a large pension fund that owns about 8.1 million shares
said it voted against the compensation plan because it relied too heavily
on the discretion of the compensation committee instead of using
performance metrics. 200 Yet, the JP Morgan was able to use this
discretion to respond to the whale and other problems in a way that a
more formulaic compensation plan would not have permitted.
Specifically, in 2012, the board cut Jamie Dimon’s compensation for
2012 substantially despite the bank’s record earnings and stock price
performance in response to the Whale, and it was able to do so because
of the discretion that it had retained. 201
JP Morgan also had a longstanding practice of including provisions in
its compensation contracts that allowed the company to cancel or claw
back previously award compensation, again on a discretionary basis.202
The clawbacks do not appear to be the result of ISS pressure or a
shareholder initiative. In the case of the whale, JP Morgan used these
clawbacks to recover compensation previously paid to the employees at
the CIO. The bank told the Senate Subcommittee that it had obtained

197. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 167, at 20. Morgan explained that it considered but
rejected shifting to a more formulaic approach.
198. See McKenna, supra note 189. ISS also objected to Dimon’s “above median CEO pay.” Id.
199. Id.
200. Glazer, supra note 183.
201. See, e.g., J.P. Morgan (JPM) CEO Dimon's Bonus Cut Over 50% in FY12; Updates on CIO
Unit,
STREETINSIDER.COM
(Jan.
16,
2013),
http://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/J.P.+Morgan+(JPM)+CEO+Dimons+Bonus+Cut+Over+
50%25+in+FY12%3B+Updates+on+CIO+Unit/8011589.html
202. In contrast, ISS focuses on a list of “problematic” pay practices that may result in a negative
recommendation but seemingly does not give firms credit for positive pay practices such as clawbacks.
See INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDER SERVICES, PROBLEMATIC PAY PRACTICES/COMMITMENTS ON
PROBLEMATIC
PAY
PRACTICES
Answer
to
FAQ
3
(2013),
available
at
http://www.issgovernance.com/file/files/ISSUSCompensationFAQs12192013.pdf. It should be noted
that Dodd-Frank Section 954 requires listed companies to establish clawback procedures for executive
compensation although the SEC has not yet implemented this requirement through rule-making. See
Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Compensation Under Dodd-Frank: an Update, N.Y.L.J. (March 21,
2014),
http://www.mccarter.com/files/Publication/d7860a65-f88f-416e-ad210970132355ff/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/10d53cea-d540-4b7e-8ac58c7c6eab159d/NYLJColumnExecutiveCompensation03.pdf (describing clawback requirement and SEC
rule-making is expected later in 2014).
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the maximum recovery permitted under its employment policies from
the CIO employees through a combination of cancelling outstanding
incentive awards and clawing back compensation previously paid. In
total, JP Morgan reported recovering over $100 million from the
employees involved in the Whale or roughly two years’ worth of
compensation. 203 The company’s decision to claw back this pay,
together with anticipation of the SEC’s implementation of required claw
backs under Dodd-Frank, appears to have sparked a broader
implementation of claw back provisions among the leading banks. 204
V. THE REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE—THE VOLCKER RULE
As this essay suggested at the outset, publicness frequently produces
a regulatory response. JP Morgan’s whale was no exception; it
contributed to the final version of the Volcker Rule. The Volcker Rule
implements Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act and “generally prohibits
any banking entity from engaging in proprietary trading.” 205 DoddFrank gave the authority for developing and implementing the Volcker
Rule to five agencies. 206 These agencies developed proposed rules,
which were submitted for public comment in October 2011. 207
The rule as initially proposed was highly controversial. Collectively,
the proposing agencies received over 18,000 letters of comment.208
Because of this controversy, the rule was stalled in political gridlock.
The New York Times reported that “Wall Street lobbyists opposed the
Volcker Rule more fiercely than any other regulation that has come
from the Dodd-Frank law.” 209 Indeed, as of early 2012, the scope of the
Rule remained uncertain.
“Government infighting and intense
lobbying” were slowing the adoption of the rule, 210 and many predicted
203. See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 151 (reporting clawbacks of over $100 million).
204. Liz Moyer, Banks Bow to New York on Clawbacks, WALL ST. J. (March 13, 2013, 8:17 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324077704578358791840450814.
205. Volcker Rule Adopting Release, supra note 16, at 1. Proprietary trading is defined as
“engaging as principal for the trading account of the banking entity in any purchase or sale of one or
more financial instruments.” Id. at 29.
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1841. The agencies were the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).
207. Volcker Rule Adopting Release, supra note 16.
208. Id. at 4–5.
209. Ben Protess & Peter Eavis, Rule That Curbs Bank Risk-Taking Nears Approval, DEALBOOK,
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/09/regulators-set-to-approve-tougher-volckerrule/.
210. Danielle Douglas, Regulators adopt final Volcker rule limits on bank trading, WASH. POST
(Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/regulators-release-final-volckerrule-limits-on-bank-trading/2013/12/10/f0d471ce-619f-11e3-8beb-3f9a9942850f_story.html.
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that the initial proposal would be scrapped and rewritten, generating
further delay in its implementation. 211
In early 2012, Jamie Dimon was one of the more vocal opponents to
the rule, terming it unnecessary and counterproductive. 212 Dimon had
particular credibility in that JP Morgan had avoided the losses suffered
by other big banks during the financial crisis. 213 And then the Whale
struck. When Dimon was called before Congress, he conceded that, if
the Volcker rule had been in effect, it might have prevented JP
Morgan’s losses due to the CIO trades. 214
The Whale proved to be the catalyst necessary to break the
congressional gridlock. On December 10, 2013, five federal agencies
jointly voted to approve not just a final version of the Volcker rule, but a
version that was more stringent than that originally proposed. 215 As
adopted, the Rule is specifically designed to make it harder for banks to
engage in risky trading strategies, although the Rule’s effectiveness in
this regard remains to be seen. 216
In particular, the toughened Volcker Rule narrowed the scope of the
rule’s carve-outs for permitted trading activities. 217 One of the most
contested subjects in the debate over Volcker had been the degree to
which bank hedging activities should continue to be permitted. The
Whale exposed the fact that hedging is hard to identify and that trades
described as hedging may nonetheless subject banks to substantial risk.
As the Senate Report on the London Whale 218 explained, the Whale was
a “hedge that wasn’t.” 219 The Report stated: “By characterizing the
211. David C. John, Volcker Rule May Make the Financial and Banking System Riskier,
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (April 26, 2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/volckerrule-may-make-the-financial-and-banking-system-riskier.
212. Joe Nocera, When Will They Learn?, N.Y. TIMES, OPINION (May 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/opinion/nocera-when-will-they-learn.html?_r=0.
213. Id.
214. In his testimony before Congress, Dimon was repeatedly pressed on the question of whether
the Volcker rule, had it been in place, would have prevented JP Morgan’s whale losses. See, e.g.,
Steven Sloan & Silla Brush, Dimon Gives Regulators New Ammunition for Volcker Rule, BLOOMBERG
(June 13, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-13/dimon-gives-regulators-newammunition-for-tougher-volcker-rule (quoting Dimon as conceding that the Volcker Rule’s ban on
proprietary trading “may very well have stopped parts of what this portfolio morphed into”).
215. Douglas, supra note 210; Emily Stephenson & Douwe Miedema, Regulators seek to curb
(Dec.
10,
2013),
Wall
St.
trades
with
Volcker
rule,
REUTERS
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/10/us-financial-regulation-volcker-idUSBRE9B705120131210.
216. John Cassidy, Two Cheers for the New Volcker Rule, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/two-cheers-for-the-new-volcker-rule.
217. Stephenson & Medema, supra note 215.
218. Senate Report, supra note 17.
219. Ron Rimkus, Two Cheers for the New Volcker Rule, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/596871-jpmorgan-chase-and-the-london-whale-understanding-thehedge-that-wasnt. One OCC examiner described it as “a “make believe voodoo magic ‘composite
hedge.’” See Senate Report, supra note 17, at 36.
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[portfolio’s] long purchases as offsets or hedges, the CIO was portraying
them as trades undertaken to lower bank risk when, in fact, they raised
risk.” To address this concern, the Volcker Rule requires banks seeking
to trade under the exemption for hedging to document the specific risks
that their hedging trades are designed to address and to continue to
monitor those trades to ensure that they continue to serve this
purpose. 220 Banks are also required to conduct “independent testing” to
ensure that the trades used for hedging “may reasonably be expected to
demonstrably reduce” the risks. 221
The Volcker rule also directly responds to the incentives created by
the compensation structure of bank employees, as identified in the
Senate Report on the Whale. In addition to banning proprietary trading,
the Volcker rule explicitly prohibits bank employees who are engaged in
exempted activities such as hedging or market-marketing from being
compensated in a manner that rewards or incentivizes prohibited
proprietary trading. 222
VI. CONCLUSION
The financial crisis has focused increasing attention on public
companies and on the extent to which their risky operational decisions
affect the overall economy. Investors and regulators have pressured
public companies to respond to this “publicness” by improving
corporate governance. One popular governance change is increased
shareholder empowerment. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive
compensation is an example of the shareholder empowerment approach.
Yet increased shareholder power is not necessarily a solution to
corporate problems. Instead it can lead to an excessive focus and
problematic focus on stock price. In turn, this can generate excessive
risk-taking and other operational decisions that have a negative effect on
long-term corporate value and may also impose negative externalities on
other corporate stakeholders such as customers and employees. This
essay argues the imperfect alignment between the interests of
shareholders and non-shareholders makes corporate governance a poor
tool for addressing the role of the corporation as a public actor.
The London Whale at JP Morgan illustrates the limitations of
shareholder oversight. To the extent that JP Morgan’s compensation
structure created an incentive for Morgan employees to engage in
excessive risk-taking, empowered shareholders had little reason to seek
220. Cassidy, supra note 216.
221. Id.
222. See Bonnie J. Roe, The Volcker Rule’s Impact on Incentive Compensation, N.Y.L.J., Mar.
24, 2014, available at https://www.cohengresser.com/assets/publications/324_ROE_NYLJ_(3).pdf.
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to limit those risks.
It would be naïve to blame either the financial crisis or the array of
problems at JP Morgan on shareholder empowerment in general or
executive pay structures in particular. Yet the Whale episode offers
reasons to look beyond both in thinking more carefully about effective
corporate governance. In particular, the Whale sounds a warning to
think more carefully about the costs and benefits of shareholder
empowerment versus economic regulation.

